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Abstract 
One of the most controversial issues in contempo-
rary research on creativity-whether a person’s creativ-
ity is domain-specific or domain-general-was investi-
gated with 109 second-grade children. The purposes of 
this study were to (1) provide empirical support for the 
domain-specific theory of creativity, (2) show relation-
ships among children’s creative performances as mea-
sured by three product-based assessments in three do-
mains (storytelling, collage making, and math word 
problems), and (3) explore the relationship between 
children’s creative performances and their general cre-
ative thinking skills, as measured by the Wallach-Ko-
gan Creative Thinking Test and the Real- World Diver-
gent Thinking Test. The findings of this study support 
the position of domain-specificity of creativity. Children 
exhibited a range of creative abilities across different do-
mains, rather than a uniform creative ability in diverse 
domains, indicating there is considerable intra-individ-
ual variation in creative ability by domain. Divergent 
thinking measures in this study did not predict creative 
performance in at least two of three, if not all, domains 
assessed in the study. Implications of the study in con-
nection with educational practices for gifted children 
are discussed. 
*     *     *     *
The supposition that human creativity is a general-ized ability-similar irrespective of the kind of dis-
cipline or subject matter involved-has guided much of 
the research and theory development in the study of 
creativity over the last 50 years (Barron, 1988; Guilford, 
1967; Hocevar, 1980; Milgram & Milgram, 1976; Plucker, 
1998; Runco, 1986; Torrance, 1966, 1988). Many re-
searchers today still propose that creativity is applicable 
across domains or disciplines (Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; 
Kay & Rogers, 1998; Taylor, 1988; Torrance, 1988). How-
ever, some recent research has argued against the exis-
tence of general creative thinking skills, and skepticism 
is growing toward the domain-general theory of creativ-
ity (Baer, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Feldman, 1980; 
Gardner, 1983, 1993a, 1993b; Kay & Rogers, 1998; Mat-
thew, 1990; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988; Weisberg, 1993). 
A paradigm shift toward a domain-specific view of 
creativity is occurring in the study of creativity. Recent 
theoretical (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Feldman, 1980, 1982, 
1994; Gardner, 1983) and empirical (Baer, 1991, 1993) lit-
erature suggests that creativity may be a more specific 
trait than was once believed. Wallach (1985) indicated 
that developmental research on creativity is undergo-
ing a shift away from the general toward the specific 
view and suggested that giftedness as well as creativ-
ity are much more domain-specific than was first under-
stood. The recent focus on domain-specific knowledge 
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Putting the Research to Use 
The results of this study suggest at least five practical 
implications for educators. 
First, using multiple assessments in diverse domains 
and performance-based assessments within real 
learning contexts are essential to assessing prop-
erly the different kinds of creative abilities in vari-
ous children. 
Second, relying only on divergent thinking tests to 
identify creative children should be avoided. 
Third, educators should make a greater effort to de-
velop appropriate means for assessing and validat-
ing diverse creative abilities. 
Fourth, individualized and domain-based teaching 
approaches, coordinated with current programs for 
teaching thinking skills or problem-solving skills, 
are necessary to address the increasing diversity in 
our school systems. Focusing less on labeling (Who 
is not creative?) and more on assessment diagnosis 
of children’s abilities and needs is also helpful. 
Fifth, intensive teacher training on attitudes toward 
the definition of and criteria for creativity and for 
the use of alternative or nontraditional assessments 
of creativity in children are essential to connect re-
search and practice. 
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has been regarded as the most dramatic shift to date in 
the study of creativity and giftedness (Feldman, 1994; 
Runco & Nemiro, 1994). 
Driving this philosophical shift has been an increas-
ing objection to the heavy emphasis placed on divergent 
thinking measures as an index of a general capacity for 
creativity (e.g., Anastasi, 1982; Baer, 1991, 1993; Brown, 
1989; Milgram, 1990; Runco & Nemiro, 1994). Although 
divergent thinking tests may predict creative achieve-
ment under some conditions, the validity of these tests 
has been questioned because of the concern that high 
scores may not always predict creative achievement 
(e.g., Baer, 1993). There is also limited convincing evi-
dence that children judged creative in one domain/dis-
cipline necessarily display strong divergent thinking 
skills (Gardner, 1993a, 1993b). Researchers have started 
to report that divergent thinking cannot be equated with 
creativity and that individual knowledge domains do 
play an important role in understanding and measuring 
creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Feldman, 1980; Gard-
ner, 1983). 
Divergent thinking might not be as valid as we have 
thought (Hong & Milgram, 1991; Runco, 1993). How-
ever, some recent research on divergent thinking has re-
ported quite respectable predictive validity coefficients 
(Runco), which suggests that divergent thinking can be 
a useful estimate of potential for some creative and orig-
inal performances. Runco also warned that researchers 
who regard divergent thinking as entirely invalid or un-
important may be ignoring recent empirical research. 
Conclusions, therefore, about creativity’s domain-
generality and -specificity remain inconsistent, incon-
clusive, and not clear-cut at all. Studies lack a clear 
and agreed upon result and conclusion and are open 
to a plethora of individual interpretations. Creativity 
has been argued as domain-general, as domain-spe-
cific, or as both depending upon the restricted theory, 
database used, or both. For example, some contem-
porary researchers of creativity seem to agree on the 
domain-specificity of creativity at least theoretically 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Gardner, 1993a, 1993b); how-
ever, their position lacks sufficient empirical support. 
There also have been research studies that introduced 
creativity as both a domain-general and -specific con-
struct and empirically distinguished them (Hong, Mil-
gram, & Gorsky, 1995), but their conclusions lacked 
solid theoretical foundations and further research sup-
port. Finally, the dichotomy in research findings may 
be caused by methodological problems, such as meth-
ods and statistics used. Bivariate analyses appear to fa-
vor specificity while multivariate analyses tend to find 
evidence for the domain-generality of creativity. Per-
formance-based assessments often produce evidence 
of specificity, while self-report scales suggest evidence 
for generality. In sum, the rush to characterize creativ-
ity as domain-general or -specific may be premature 
because of selective interpretation of theory, signifi-
cant methodological limitations, and circuitous logic 
(Plucker, 1998). Further evidence is needed to inform 
the debate. 
Rationale and Purpose of the Study 
The domain-specific view of creativity was influ-
enced strongly by the multiple intelligences theory in 
which Gardner (1983) proposed seven (later eight) dis-
tinct kinds of intelligences or domains of cognitive ac-
tivity. Gardner (1988) suggested that we should no lon-
ger speak of an individual as being creative; instead, we 
should make an effort to recognize the possibility of a 
person’s creativity in specific domains. Some educators 
in the field of gifted education have adopted Gardner’s 
view and have begun to consider giftedness as “domain-
specific and not simply a general indicator of intellec-
tual ability” (Feldman, 1994, p. 8). Although several in-
telligence and measurement researchers have cautioned 
educators that multiple intelligences theory still has rel-
atively little research support (Matthew, 1988), Gard-
ner’s view is well accepted among some gifted educa-
tors because it emphasizes the breadth, pluralism, and 
diversity of individuals’ competencies. 
The issue of the domain-specificity or -generality of 
creativity is important and controversial because it has 
broad implications for the identification of and educa-
tional practices used with creative children. For exam-
ple, denying the domain-general approach to creativ-
ity is similar to denying the existence of general creative 
thinking skills and, therefore, is equal to denying the 
importance of divergent thinking in understanding and 
assessing creativity. Such a view is a huge threat to the 
most current practices used for identifying creativity 
and giftedness in school-age children (Baer, 1993). Be-
cause no clear definition of creativity dominates the lit-
erature, many professionals have used divergent think-
ing ability to define creativity. The terms creativity and 
divergent thinking may even be used rather interchange-
ably. Some educators believe that creativity is what di-
vergent thinking tests measure, as intelligence is what 
an intelligence test measures. 
Baer (1994a) pointed out that each year millions of 
children take general creative thinking tests, such as di-
vergent thinking tests, under the assumption that cre-
ativity is a general trait that runs across diverse domains 
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and that the identification of highly divergent thinkers 
is equivalent to identifying creative learners. Further-
more, some researchers still advocate using these tests 
for selection of gifted students and as outcome measures 
for evaluating creativity training programs (Cramond, 
1994). If the assumption that creativity is domain-gen-
eral is wrong, the current educational practice for iden-
tifying creative children is both “a waste of educational 
resources and an unfair basis for making placement de-
cisions” (Baer, p. 80). In addition, the domain issue of 
creativity also has numerous implications for the de-
sign of educational programs that attempt to stimulate 
or enhance children’s creative abilities (Plucker, 1998). 
If creativity is a domain-general trait, training of gen-
eral creative skills will be an effective way to enhance 
children’s creative abilities. On the contrary, if creativ-
ity is domain-specific, children’s individual creative 
abilities will be best fostered within the context of par-
ticular talent areas (Plucker). For these reasons, Plucker 
suggested that research on the domain-generality and 
domain-specificity of creativity is necessary, important, 
and should continue. 
Furthermore, although there is a growing interest in 
the domain-specific theory of creativity, the research 
supporting this view still remains quite limited (Baer, 
1998; Bamberger, 1990; Plucker, 1998; Tardif & Stern-
berg, 1988). Authors who support a domain-specificity 
view of creativity have not always addressed their argu-
ments in a thoroughly convincing manner (Kogan, 1994; 
Plucker), and most studies exploring this issue have 
been limited in several ways. 
First, most studies that have explored the domain is-
sue of creativity have been limited to the use of a self-
report scale as a measure of creative performance in 
diverse domains, resulting in support for creativity’s 
domain-generality (Hocevar, 1980; Milgram & Mil-
gram, 1976; Runco, 1986, 1987). Although some re-
searchers suggest that self-report scales are concep-
tually and psychometrically reasonable measures, 
especially when the creative accomplishment is mea-
sured (Hocevar), self-report scales have been criticized 
for their lack of reliability and validity in assessing cre-
ative abilities (especially in young children; Brown, 
1989). Performance-based or product-based assess-
ments using expert consensus (Amabile, 1983, 1996) 
have been strongly recommended instead for assess-
ing children’s creative abilities in diverse domains. Al-
though performance-based assessment is not without 
its problems, such as a lack of generality, increased cost, 
more involved scoring, and so on, performance-based 
assessment is well accepted because it embeds assess-
ment in meaningful, intelligence-fair, real-world activ-
ities. However, few studies to date have used perfor-
mance-based assessments; those that have were limited 
to a single or a few performance-based assessments in 
one or two domains. In addition, very few studies have 
used expert consensus in evaluating children’s perfor-
mance-based products to explore the question of cre-
ativity’s domain-specificity or -generality. 
Second, although researchers have shown interest 
in looking at the relationship between divergent think-
ing and creative performances, few studies have paid 
attention to the relationships among children’s diverse 
creative performances in diverse domains. Researchers 
have been mainly interested in criterion-related valid-
ity (concurrent or predictive) of divergent thinking mea-
sures in predicting creative performances. However, ex-
ploration of interrelations among a person’s creative 
performances in different domains is essential in inves-
tigating the question of the domain-specificity and -gen-
erality of creativity. 
Third, no study to date has utilized a battery of di-
vergent thinking tests to explore the domain-specific-
ity and domain-generality issue. Most studies have re-
lied on a single divergent thinking test, thereby lacking 
the support of an adequate database. Since the correla-
tions among various divergent thinking tests suggest 
that each taps various aspects of divergent thinking (Ko-
gan, 1994), the use of a battery of divergent thinking 
tests would be necessary for careful examination of the 
domain issue. 
Fourth, it has been suggested that divergent thinking 
tests would be more predictive of real-world creative 
performances if they contained problems children might 
encounter in their school or home settings (Hong & Mil-
gram, 1991; Okuda, Runco, & Berger, 1991; Runco, 1993; 
Runco & Okuda, 1988). However, the studies utilizing 
real-world divergent thinking tasks have correlated re-
sults only with self-report scales as measures of creative 
performances in diverse domains. There has been no 
published study that looks at the relationship between 
a real-world divergent thinking test and children’s cre-
ative performances in diverse domains utilizing perfor-
mance-based assessments. 
Finally, most studies in this area have involved older 
subjects (e.g., high school students, college students). 
Published studies on young children (age 3-8 years) in 
this area have been meager (Godwin & Moran, 1990; 
Hennessey & Amabile, 1988) and limited to small sam-
ple sizes (e.g., Baer, 1991). Since early identification and 
early nurturing of creative children are believed es-
sential for optimal educational and social outcomes of 
gifted children (Milgram, 1990), examination of this is-
sue with younger and larger samples is important. 
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Thus, the purpose of the present study was to inves-
tigate the issue of the domain-specificity and domain-
generality of creativity in young children. To exam-
ine this issue, this study explored (1) the relationships 
among children’s creative performances in three do-
mains and (2) the relationships between children’s gen-
eral creative thinking skills and children’s creative per-
formances in three domains. Children’s performances in 
language, art, and math domains were judged by nine 
expert judges who rated children’s creativity in story-
telling, collage-making, and math word-problem-cre-
ating tasks. Children’s general creative thinking skills 
were assessed by a battery of two divergent thinking 
tests, including subtests of the Wallach- Kogan Creativ-
ity Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and the Real World Di-
vergent Thinking Test adapted from the work of Okuda, 
Runco, and Berger (1991). 
Method 
Subjects 
One-hundred and nine second-grade children from 
five urban elementary schools, 53 (49%) boys and 56 
(51%) girls, participated in the present study. The age 
range of the subjects varied from 7.01 (85 months) to 
8.09 (104 months) years, with a mean of 7.10 years (93.7 
months) and a standard deviation of 4.4 months. 
Instruments 
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test. Two verbal subtests 
(Alternate Uses and Similarities) and one nonverbal 
subtest (Pattern Meanings) of the Wallach-Kogan Cre-
ativity Test were selected for the present study. Each 
verbal or nonverbal subtest had three items in it. In ad-
dition, the Wallach- Kogan Creativity Test was modified 
to include problem-finding tasks. It has been suggested 
that problem-finding tasks enhance the validity of di-
vergent thinking tests as measures of creativity (Wake-
field, 1985, 1992). Therefore, three items in each subtest 
were composed of two problem-solving tasks and one 
problem-finding task. The problem-solving tasks in each 
subtest asked children to tell all the different ways they 
could use an object, how two objects are alike, or all the 
things a pattern could be. The problem-finding task in 
each subtest asked children to generate a problem and 
then provide a solution to it. For example, a problem-
finding task in the Pattern Meanings subtest was “Here 
is a blank card and a pencil. Make a pattern of your 
own, then tell me all the different things it could be.” 
Scoring followed the standard scheme suggested 
in the test manual. Fluency (number of responses) and 
originality (number of unique responses) scores for 
each problem- solving task and a fluency score for each 
problem-finding task were generated. The scores were 
summed across the subtests to yield scores for Wallach-
Kogan problem-solving fluency (WKF), problem-solv-
ing originality (WKO), and problem-finding fluency 
(WKPF). 
Real- World Divergent Thinking Test. A Real-World 
Divergent Thinking Test, adapted from Okuda, Runco, 
and Berger (1991), was used in this study. The adap-
tation for the present study contained situations and 
problems relevant for second-grade children. In this 
study, four real-world divergent thinking tasks (two 
problem-solving and two problem-finding tasks) were 
used. All tasks were related to a school situation. In the 
real-world problem-solving tasks, students heard prob-
lems related to school life read aloud by the examiner. 
Students were asked to provide as many solutions as 
possible. For the real-world problem-finding tasks, stu-
dents heard problematic vignettes about school life and 
were asked to list all the problems they could think of 
in each of these settings. The problem-solving tasks 
were scored for fluency (number of responses given, 
RWF) and originality (number of unique responses pro-
duced by less than 5% of children in the sample, RWO), 
and the problem-finding tasks were scored only for flu-
ency (RWPF). Scoring for the Wallach- Kogan Creativ-
ity Test and the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test 
was done by the first author and two trained graduate 
students. The agreement between the three scorers was 
95% or higher across all subtests of the two divergent 
thinking tests. 
Performance-based assessments. Three performance-
based assessments were utilized in this study. The three 
assessments included: a storytelling task (language), 
a collage-making task (art), and a math word-prob-
lem task (math). All tasks were selected from various 
sources using Amabile’s (1983, 1996) guidelines for se-
lecting appropriate tasks for a consensual assessment. 
Amabile (1996) indicated that an appropriate task for 
a consensual assessment should meet the following re-
quirements: (1) the task must lead to some product that 
can be available to appropriate judges for evaluation, 
and (2) the task should be open-ended enough to permit 
flexibility and novelty in children’s responses. 
The storytelling and the collage-making tasks for the 
present study were developed by Amabile (1983), and 
have been validated in more than 30 independent stud-
ies by Amabile (1983, 1996), her colleagues, and others 
(Baer, 1991, 1993). High interrater reliability and long-
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term validity have been reported for these tasks (Ama-
bile, 1983, 1996; Bear, 1994b). For the storytelling task, 
each individual child was shown the picture book A 
Boy, a Dog, a Frog, and a Friend (Mayer, 1971). After look-
ing through it to become familiar with the story, the 
child was asked to tell a story in his or her own words 
by saying one thing about each page while looking at 
the book’s pictures. For the collage-making task, each 
child was given identical sets of materials to work with: 
a 14” x 22” piece of white tag board, a bottle of glue, and 
a set of more than 100 precut pieces of construction pa-
per in several different sizes, shapes, and colors. Each 
child was asked to make an interesting, silly design us-
ing all the materials provided. 
The math word-problem task was adapted from 
Baer’s (1991) study, where high interrater reliability in-
formation was reported. For the math word-problem 
task, children were asked to tell an interesting and orig-
inal math word problem. Children were not asked to 
solve the problem they created, but instructed to make 
sure all needed information was included so that the 
problem could be solved by someone else. Children 
were instructed that they could use paper and pencil to 
create their math problems. 
All performance-based assessments were judged 
for their creativity by nine expert judges (three judges 
in each domain) selected for this study. Based on Am-
abile’s (1996) guidelines on consensual techniques for 
creativity assessment, judges were selected based on 
their experience and expertise in each domain. For each 
domain, teachers who had specialized credentials and 
at least five years of experience in teaching children’s 
creative writing, art, or math were selected as judges 
for the study. To avoid any biases (e.g., settings, time 
of the day, moods, etc.) in scoring, all judges gath-
ered at the same place and at the same time for four 
hours and had no knowledge of the identity of the au-
thor of each product. Each judge made his or her as-
sessment independently in a separate room and rated 
children’s products on a 1.0 (low) to 5.0 (high) numer-
ical scale based on his or her own definition of creativ-
ity. As recommended by Amabile (1983, 1996), judges 
were not trained to agree with one another, nor given 
specific criteria for creativity. However, judges were 
instructed to rate children’s products relative to other 
students’ products of the task examined, rather than 
rating them against some absolute standards. Amabile 
suggested this is important because the levels of cre-
ativity produced by the ordinary children would be 
low in comparison with the greatest works produced 
in that domain. Once the judgments in all performance-
based assessments were completed, the judges’ ratings 
on each assessment were analyzed for interjudge reli-
ability. Children’s scores on each assessment were cal-
culated by averaging the three judges’ ratings. Judges 
were paid for their work in this study. 
Procedures 
All the measures, except one performance-based as-
sessment, were administered individually and untimed. 
A small, quiet, and simply decorated room in each par-
ticipating school was used to carry out each individu-
ally administered assessment. The examiner made an 
effort to establish rapport with each child in the assess-
ment setting before the assessment was undertaken, and 
all the measures were administered in a game-like at-
mosphere. In most cases, all measures were adminis-
tered during one session in about a 30-minute to 1-hour 
time period. To avoid any order effect in the adminis-
tration procedure, all measures were administered in 
the same sequence with the Wallach-Kogan Creativity 
Test given first, followed by the Real-World Divergent 
Thinking Test, storytelling, and math word-problem. If 
the child displayed some fatigue or disinterest during 
the testing, testing was stopped and administered at an-
other time. One performance-based assessment, collage 
making, was administered in a small-group setting at a 
time convenient to classroom teachers. All assessments 
were coded by number, not by child’s name or child’s 
ID, to avoid any biases in scoring. 
Results 
Divergent Thinking Skills 
The reliability of each divergent thinking test was 
evaluated with inter-item correlations (Cronbach’s al-
pha). Alpha coefficients were calculated for each sub-
test score of the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test and the 
Real-World Divergent Thinking Test, respectively. The 
alpha coefficients for the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test 
and the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test were quite 
high and all adequate. Table 1 presents the alpha coeffi-
cients with the means, standard deviations, and range 
of subtest scores for the two divergent thinking tests 
used in the study. Pearson correlation was used to ex-
amine the within and between relationships of the two 
divergent thinking tests. Table 2 presents these results. 
The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test subtest scores, prob-
lem-solving fluency (WKF), problem-solving original-
ity (WKO), and problem- finding fluency (WKPF) were 
strongly and significantly related to each other. Simi-
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larly, the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test subtest 
scores were also significantly related to each other, ex-
cept the relationship between the problem-solving orig-
inality score (RWO) and problem-finding fluency score 
(RWPF; r = .206). Furthermore, all subtest scores of the 
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test were significantly re-
lated to the scores of the Real-World Divergent Think-
ing Test.   
Creative Performances 
Likewise, interjudge reliabilities were calculated for 
the storytelling, collage-making, and math word-prob-
lem-creating tasks using the Cronbach’s coefficient al-
pha. As shown in Table 3, interjudge agreement among 
the three judges in each domain was fairly high in this 
study. Ensuring high interjudge reliability is the most 
important criterion of a consensual assessment proce-
dure, since interjudge reliability in a study like this is 
equivalent to construct validity (Amabile, 1996).    
Is Creative Performance in One Domain Predictive of 
Performance in Other Domains? 
Pearson correlations were conducted to explore the 
relationships among the three performance-based as-
sessments of storytelling, collage making, and the math 
word-problem. Among the three performance-based as-
sessments, the only significant relationship was found 
between the storytelling and the math word-problem 
(r = .283, p = .004). However, storytelling was not sig-
nificantly related to collage making, nor was the math 
word-problem related to collage making. Although sta-
tistically significant, the correlation between the story-
telling and math tasks was relatively weak (r = .283), 
and the weak correlation made it difficult to predict 
one task from the other. Table 4 shows the correlations 
among the three performance-based assessments for the 
109 children. 
Do General Creative Thinking Skills Predict Creative 
Performances? 
Several statistical analyses were conducted to exam-
ine the relationship between the two divergent thinking 
tests used in this study and the three performance-based 
assessments. First, Pearson correlation analyses were 
conducted to examine the relationships between the 
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WK), the Real-World 
Divergent Thinking Test (RW), and the three perfor-
mance-based assessments. Table 5 presents the detailed 
results. 
Two of the six subtest scores of the two divergent 
thinking tests were significantly related to the story-
telling task (p < .01). The highest correlation existed for 
the Wallach-Kogan problem-solving originality score 
(WKO; r = .365). No significant relationship was found 
between any of the subtest scores of the two divergent 
thinking tests and the math word-problem task or col-
lage-making tasks. 
Multiple regression analyses were also conducted to 
examine how much of the variances for the three per-
formance- based assessments were explained by the six 
subtest scores of the Wallach-Kogan and the Real-World 
Divergent Thinking Tests. Examination of the regression 
analysis reveals that the six subtest scores of the two di-
vergent thinking tests did not explain significant nor 
substantial proportions of the variances (at p < .01 level) 
in any of the three performance-based assessments. The 
results indicated, however, that the six subtest scores of 
the two divergent thinking tests accounted for a margin-
ally significant 14% (p = .02) of the variance in the sto-
rytelling task. The six subtest scores accounted for only 
8% of the variance in the collage-making and 5.7% in the 
math word-problem tasks. 
The results were similar when multiple regression 
analyses were conducted for each divergent thinking 
test. Specifically, the three subtest scores of the Wallach-
Kogan Creativity Test accounted for about 13.6% (p = 
.002) of the variance in storytelling, 4.3% in math, and 
only 2.7% in collage making. The three subtest scores 
Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation, Range, and Al-
pha Coefficient for Subtest Scores of the Wallach-
Kogan Creativity Test and the Real-World Divergent 
Thinking Test 
Measures  M  SD  Range  Alpha 
Wallach-Kogan 
Problem-solving tasks 
   Fluency  36.60  20.20 9-101  .93 
   Originality  5.62  6.33  0-34   .84 
Problem-finding tasks 
   Fluency  23.33  11.87  8-69  .77 
Real-World 
Problem-solving tasks 
   Fluency  9.20  6.82  1-43  .94 
   Originality  1.01  2.48  0-13  .90 
Problem-finding tasks 
   Fluency  11.25  9.42  0-60  .89
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of the Real- World Divergent Thinking Test did not ex-
plain a significant proportion of the variances in any 
of the three performance- based assessments, but ac-
counted for only a marginally significant 8% (p = .04) of 
the variance in storytelling, 5.1% in collage making, and 
1.4% in math word-problem tasks.  
Although the multiple regression analysis provides 
information about the extent to which the Wallach-
Kogan Creativity Test and the Real-World Divergent 
Thinking Test explain and predict each dependent vari-
able (performance-based assessments) separately, the 
procedure ignores the very essence and richness of a 
multifaceted phenomenon between the multiple depen-
dent and independent variables. Canonical correlations, 
therefore, were used to demonstrate an interrelationship 
between these two sets of multiple variables. 
Canonical analysis was conducted to explain the ex-
tent to which one set of criterion variables (storytell-
ing, collage making, and math word-problems) were 
predicted or explained by another set of predictor vari-
ables (the six subtest scores of the two divergent think-
ing tests). Results indicated that the predictor variate 
was not significantly correlated with the criterion vari-
ate (Rc = .407, c2 [100] = 24.23, p = .148). Any combina-
tion of the six subtests did not explain or predict signifi-
cantly any combination of the three performance-based 
assessments. The divergent thinking measures and the 
creative performances in three domains were indepen-
dent of one another. Because no significant correlation 
was found between the two sets of variables, no further 
analysis was made.  
Discussion 
Creativity as Domain-Specific 
The results of the study suggest that there is consider-
able intra-individual variation in creative ability by do-
main in the 109 second-grade children who participated 
Table 2. Pearson Correlations Between the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test and Real-World Divergent Think-
ing Test (N = 109) 
 WKF  WKO  WKPF  RWF  RWO  RWPF 
WKF  1.00  .746*  .810*  .634*  .449*  .568* 
WKO   1.00  .595*  .510*  .524*  .331* 
WKPF    1.00  .558*  .365*  .601* 
RWF     1.00  .640*  .369* 
RWO      1.00  .206 
RWPF       1.00 
WKF = WK problem-solving fluency; WKO = WK problem-solving originality; WKPF = WK problem-finding flu-
ency; RWF = RW problem-solving fluency; RWO = RW problem-solving originality; RWPF = RW problem-find-
ing fluency 
* p < 0.01 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations Between Storytelling, 
Collage Making, and the Math Word Problem (N = 
109) 
Tasks  Story-  Collage  Math 
 telling  Making  Problem 
Storytelling  1.00  .072  .238* 
Collage making    1.00  .195 
Math word-problem      1.00 
* p < 0.01    
Table  3. Mean Ratings, Standard Deviations, and 
Alpha Coefficient for the Three Performance-Based 
Assessments (N = 109) 
Tasks  M*  SD  Alpha 
Storytelling  2.37  1.12  .88 
Collage making  2.91  1.21  .94 
Math word-problem  2.26  1.25  .92 
* Rating: 1 (not creative) to 5 (highly creative). 
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in the study. Children in the study exhibited a range of 
creative abilities across different domains, rather than 
a uniform creative ability in diverse domains. It is im-
plied from the study that it is hard to predict reliably 
a child’s creative ability in one domain based on his 
or her creative ability in other domains, thereby pro-
viding some support for the domain-specific theory of 
creativity.  
Although a significant relationship existed between 
storytelling and math word-problem tasks in the whole 
sample of 109 children, the correlation between the 
tasks was weak (r = .283) and not substantial at all. This 
weak but significant relationship might be explained in 
the fact that both tasks utilized a similar task format. 
In the storytelling task, children were asked to gener-
ate a story based on a wordless picture book, and in the 
math word-problem, children were asked to make up 
a math-related story problem. The fact that both tasks 
required verbal explanations might be responsible for 
the significant relationship between the storytelling and 
math word-problem tasks. The weak but significant re-
lationship between the tasks also might be attributed 
to individual “style” that is defined as a manner of ap-
proaching and accomplishing tasks (Miller, 1991). As 
Adams (1993) suggested, the weak but significant cor-
relation between such tasks may reflect the systematic 
influence of style, rather than links between the con-
tent areas themselves. Adams indicated that, if indi-
viduals adopt the same style in two different tasks, the 
positive and significant correlation between the tasks 
is the function of style, not a true reflection of associa-
tion between different knowledge domains. However, 
whether the weak but significant correlation between 
the storytelling and math word-problem tasks is attrib-
uted to domain-general creative ability, similar task for-
mat, individual’s style toward a task, or other affective 
factors that may cut across domains-such as creative 
self-efficacy or motivation-cannot be explained empir-
ically in this study. Replication would be useful in ex-
amining whether similar patterns are found in further 
studies and in exploring possible causes for association 
between the tasks. 
Taken together, these findings are in contrast to the 
previous research (e.g., Hocevar, 1980; Hong, Milgram, 
& Gorsky, 1995) that suggested that creative perfor-
mances in different domains for young children were 
significantly related to each other and rather domain-
general. The results also stand out against the com-
monly held claim that children are creative in many 
different domains. These findings are, then again, con-
sistent with some other earlier research (e.g., Baer, 1991) 
that suggested creative performances are domain-spe-
cific. By employing a large sample of 109 children and 
utilizing performance-based assessments (not depend-
ing on self-report scales) to assess creative ability in 
children, however, this study provides a more valid re-
sponse to the controversial issue of the domain-specific-
ity and -generality of creativity. Nevertheless, because 
no study to date (including this one) has found abso-
lute independence or dependence between tasks in dif-
ferent domains, interpretation and conclusion regarding 
creativity’s domain-generality and -specificity should be 
made very carefully. 
Divergent Thinking as a General Creative Thinking 
Ability 
One of the most striking findings of the study was 
that divergent thinking measures did not have great 
power in predicting creative performances in at least 
two of three, if not all, domains assessed in the study. 
Neither of the divergent thinking tests administered in 
the study, separately or in a battery, predicted real cre-
ative behaviors of 109 young children. The amount of 
variances explained by the two divergent thinking tests 
in the collage and math tasks were relatively small. Al-
though two subtests of the Wallach-Kogan Creativity 
Tests were significantly related to the storytelling per-
formance, the amount of variance explained by the two 
divergent measures, separately or in a battery, was not 
substantial. In creativity research, “good” test correla-
tions with outside validating criteria run between .40 
Table 5. Pearson Correlations for the Wallach-Ko-
gan Creativity Test, the Real-World Divergent Think-
ing Test, and Three Performance-Based Assess-
ments (N = 109) 
Measures  Story-  Collage  Math 
 telling  Making  Problem 
WKF  .306*  .069  .120 
WKO  .365*  .150  .192 
WKPF  .231  .073  .135 
RWF  .243  –.011  .026 
RWO  .247  .038  .019 
RWPF  .157  .197  .116 
WKF = WK problem-solving fluency; WKO = WK 
problem-solving originality; WKPF = WK problem-
finding fluency; RWF = RW problem-solving flu-
ency; RWO = RW problem-solving originality; RWPF 
= RW problem-finding fluency 
* p < 0.01  
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and .65 because of the host of factors affecting test and 
criterion data (Bartlett & Davis, 1974). None of the cor-
relations between the two divergent thinking tests and 
the storytelling task reached this range of “good.” More 
importantly, the canonical correlation indicated that the 
two divergent thinking tests and children’s creative per-
formances in the three domains were independent of 
one another. 
The findings of the study both complement and con-
trast with earlier research. These findings are consistent 
with some of the previous research in that divergent 
thinking measures were often weakly but significantly 
related to creative activities in the language domain (i.e., 
storytelling, writing), but not to creative behaviors in 
other domains (Baer, 1991; Runco, 1986). The current re-
sults suggest a possible verbal bias in divergent think-
ing tests; however, the use of only one nonverbal subtest 
(from the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test) in the present 
study may have contributed to these results. 
The results also contrast with earlier research efforts 
(e.g., Bartlett & Davis, 1974; Hocevar, 1980; Hong, Mil-
gram, & Gorsky, 1995; Torrance, 1972; Wallach & Kogan, 
1965; Wallach & Wing, 1969) that have found significant 
relationships between divergent thinking measures and 
diverse creative performances (i.e., leadership, art, so-
cial service, literature, writing, math, science, crafts). 
As indicated, the contrast might be due to the fact that 
the earlier research has depended on self-report scales 
to measure children’s creative performances in different 
domains. As indicated, self-report scales, however, have 
been criticized for their questionable validity and the re-
sponse-set bias that may lead individuals to systemat-
ically underestimate or overestimate their creative be-
haviors across all domains (Baer, 1999). 
Overall, these findings of the present study suggest 
the lack, if not absence, of general creative thinking 
skills in explaining children’s creative performances. On 
the other hand, the results might be interpreted as say-
ing that divergent thinking measures may not represent 
a general creative thinking ability appropriately. These 
findings have important practical implications, since di-
vergent thinking tests are widely used to identify cre-
ative children in a wide variety of domains, and they are 
often regarded as a criterion, rather than a correlate or 
predictor of creative behavior. 
Despite these findings, this study is admittedly lim-
ited in several ways. Children in the present study were 
assessed only once for their creative performances. It 
may be possible that creative performance measured 
at other times and in other settings will show different 
results. In addition, use of a single task to sample chil-
dren’s creative ability in each domain may not suffi-
ciently reveal the children’s true abilities for a given 
domain (Leondar, 1977). Use of at least two tasks in 
the same domain, gathering data through observation 
in class over time, or both could minimize any distor-
tion that may happen during one-shot assessments and 
provide more valid evidences of creative performances 
across domains in young children. Furthermore, the ad-
aptation of the divergent thinking tests used in the pres-
ent study and the order of item administration may 
have affected the results of the present study. Replica-
tion of the study should be made to find any possible ef-
fects of these factors. 
Better understanding of the domain-generality and 
-specificity of creativity might also be possible if sep-
arate additional analyses of creative and noncreative 
groups of children were used. Studying these groups 
separately for example, in examining the relationship 
between general creative thinking skills and creative 
performances would increase the understanding of the 
domain issue of creativity. Such analyses need large 
sample sizes and unfortunately could not be addressed 
in this study. 
Future research should explore whether the “pro-
cess” of creative performance in different domains is 
general or specific to a particular domain. Identifying 
the important (social/psychological) variables that in-
fluence creative performances in diverse domains in 
young children and how the variables interact with each 
other remains unknown. Finally, systematic observation 
of four groups of children who are both creative and di-
vergent, who are creative but not divergent, who are not 
creative but divergent, and neither creative nor diver-
gent would also provide interesting information for the 
domain issue of creativity. 
Implications of the Study 
One of the most critical issues in gifted education has 
been its failure to identify appropriately and plan ade-
quately programs for all young gifted children. The ma-
jor cause of our failure has been the procedure currently 
employed to assess and identify giftedness and creativ-
ity in our school systems. The findings of this study 
suggest that creative performances may be quite (but 
not absolutely) domain-specific in young children, and 
some divergent thinking tests (or subtests) as a mea-
sure of creative abilities in young children may not be as 
valid as we have thought. It is obvious from this study 
that there are various kinds of creativity, and it is hard 
to predict reliably a child’s creative ability in one do-
main based on his or her creative ability in other do-
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mains or simply his or her divergent thinking test scores 
in all cases. This study clearly indicates that an appre-
ciable number of children who score low on divergent 
thinking tests can be identified as “creative” by their 
creative performances using different measures of cre-
ativity. Furthermore, the results imply that we may 
overlook many extremely creative children and prevent 
their enrollment in gifted education programs if we es-
tablish a level on some single standardized measure of 
creativity without considering each child’s performance 
strengths and weaknesses. 
Use of multiple assessments in diverse domains and 
performance-based assessments within real learning 
contexts are essential to assessing properly the different 
kinds of creative abilities in various children. To accom-
plish this goal, however, more effort should be made to 
develop and validate appropriate means for assessing 
diverse creative abilities. 
The proposed domain-specific approach in identify-
ing creative children has various advantages over cur-
rent identification procedures that are rooted in do-
main-general philosophy and depend on divergent 
thinking tests. Most of all, as Gardner (1983) once re-
marked, domain-specific views of creativity can help 
educators shift their interest from “How creative is 
she?” to “How is she creative?” By considering specific 
strengths of individual children, identification based on 
a domain-specific view can provide information about 
the nature of creative abilities revealed by a particular 
child that might, in turn, suggest how a program might 
be designed to challenge effectively the child’s spe-
cial abilities (Treffinger & Feldhusen, 1996). Once the 
specific domains in which individual children demon-
strate their creativity are found, Treffinger and Feldhu-
sen have indicated that educational services and inter-
ventions can be focused more accurately and effectively 
on those, having two goals of “nurturing already recog-
nized creativity in a specific domain” and “discovering/
developing new ones.” So far, these great advantages 
of domain-specific approaches, however, have been ig-
nored and overshadowed by the frequent use of diver-
gent thinking tests with subsequent lack of applicability 
to instructional planning. 
Recent research supports this position by confirming 
that specific interventions focused on specific domains 
are far more effective than general “gifted treatment,” 
which usually offers “all-purpose” enrichment pro-
grams for all kinds of gifted children (Bloom, 1985; Csik-
szentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen, 1993; Treffinger & 
Feldhusen, 1996). Enormous evidences have suggested 
that our gifted children are poorly served by standard 
enrichment programs that do not consider seriously 
their individuality (U.S. Office of Education, 1993). 
However, this is not arguing that we should abandon 
the current programs of teaching general thinking skills 
or problem-solving skills in our schools. Even with all 
the negatives mentioned on the above, there is no doubt 
that improving children’s creative thinking and prob-
lem-solving abilities in diverse domains are essential ed-
ucational goals (Treffinger, 1986; Treffinger & Feldhu-
sen, 1996). In fact, general creative thinking skills can 
and should continue to be encouraged in every domain 
and area of giftedness and talent. Individualized and 
domain-based approaches, coordinated with current 
programs for teaching thinking skills or problem-solv-
ing skills, however, may be the best way to address the 
increasing diversity in our school systems. 
Currently, an extensive paradigm shift in the field of 
gifted education is occurring: the movement of “talent 
development” (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen, 
1993; Gagne, 1985; Renzulli, 1994; Treffinger, 1995; Tre-
ffinger & Feldhusen, 1996; VanTassel-Baska, 1997). Ed-
ucators of gifted children are being challenged to take 
account of the proposition that recognition and devel-
opment of various talents among children are the most 
powerful contribution to education (Feldman, 1980; Tre-
ffinger, 1995). Clearly, the idea of domain-specificity of 
creativity seems to reflect this current trend, and the tal-
ent development approach firmly supports the identifi-
cation and development of an individual child’s creative 
ability in a particular domain. One main idea behind 
these new concepts is appreciating and responding to 
individual differences, thereby more broadly recogniz-
ing and developing many kinds of human strengths and 
talents. 
In closing, the question of domain-generality and 
-specificity in cognitive abilities, including creativity, 
might not be the unanswerable riddle that Sternberg 
(1989) once mentioned it was. It is true, however, that it 
is a very complicated and difficult question. As Keating 
and Crane (1990) have noted, “dichotomies in thinking 
are sometimes useful, sometimes misleading, but ap-
parently unavoidable” (p. 411). The evidences from this 
study and other research support the perspective that a 
domain-general view of creativity has often misguided 
the identification of and educational practices for our 
creative children. Domain-general views of creativity 
that seek to reinforce the “generality,” rather than view-
ing it the other way around, are too limited, but have 
been maintained for the sake of today’s status quo in 
identifying creative children in our school systems. A 
domain-specific view may offer more useful, flexible, 
and reasonable directions for identifying and educating 
creative potentials for their optimal developments.    
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